主题: From Uncertainty to Strategy: Optimal Design of Premium Virtual Products with Negative Network Effects

题目：从不确定性到策略：负向网络效应下高级虚拟产品的最优设计

时间: 2026年3月25日上午10:00-11:00

地点:  管理科研楼第二教室

主讲人: Hao Ying, Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administration, Hong Kong Shue Yan University

 Bio:

Hao Ying is an Assistant Professor in theDepartment of Business Administration at theHong Kong Shue Yan University. He holds a Ph.D. in Management Information Systems from The Chinese University of Hong Kong, an M.Sc. in Information Systems and Operations Management from the University of Florida, and a B.A. in Applied Mathematical Sciences and Economics from the University of Connecticut. His research focuses on the Economics of Information Systems, FinTech, and AI. His work has been published in Journal of the Association for Information Systems and Decision Support Systems.

照片：

Abstract: 

Premium virtual products exhibit a distinctive type of negative network effect, setting them apart from other digital products characterized primarily by positive network effects. This specific negative network effect arises when game providers adopt the freemium business model, enabling fee-paying players equipped with powerful virtual products to compete against free players who have access only to basic items. Although the freemium business model is widely adopted in the gaming industry and well-documented in the academic literature, scenarios involving competition between heterogeneous consumer groups—which lead to a negative network effect—have been largely overlooked. In this paper, we propose an analytical model to investigate the conditions under which the freemium business model should be adopted, considering the trade-off among positive and negative network effects and demand cannibalization. We find that when free players are allowed to enter the game, the game provider should not necessarily incentivize these players to participate in competition, under certain conditions. Furthermore, if the game provider can design the competitive advantage of the premium product, under sufficiently high network effect intensity, offering free access and encouraging free player participation in competition yields maximum profit but minimizes player surplus. Finally, we identify a novel product design strategy—introducing uncertainty into the competitive advantage of premium products is recommended when the negative network effect is present.