题目：过度控制权是否也有积极的一面？双重股权结构与CEO-员工薪酬差距

Title: Do excess control rights have a bright side? Dual-class structure and CEO-worker pay gap

时间:  2026年3月12日 10:00 – 11:30 

地点: 管理科研楼 第一教室

主讲人: Hui Zhou, University of Auckland

Host: 李雄 Alex

Bio:Hui Zhou 是奥克兰大学（University of Auckland）会计与金融系高级讲师 。她于2011 年在伊利诺伊大学厄巴纳—香槟分校（University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign）获得会计学博士学位。2019 年加入奥克兰大学之前，她曾在墨尔本大学商学院（Melbourne Business School）担任会计学助理教授。Hui 目前的研究议程主要涵盖三个方向：会计与公司治理的交叉领域、会计信息在资本市场中的作用，以及利益相关者会计。她的研究成果已发表于多本国际一流学术期刊，包括Accounting, Organizations & Society、Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 和Review of Accounting Studies。Hui 曾获得多项具有竞争性的科研资助与研究奖项，其中包括墨尔本大学商业与经济学院于2018 年授予的“院长卓越研究杰出奖”（Dean’s Award for Exceptional Distinction in Research）。在教学方面，她曾在墨尔本大学商学院与奥克兰大学商学院为MBA、EMBA 以及专业硕士项目授课。除学术背景外，Hui 还持有特许金融分析师（CFA）资格认证。

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Abstract: 

We study the link between dual-class structure and CEO-employee pay disparity. Using a sample of firms listed on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX from 2005 to 2023, we find that dual-class firms have smaller CEO-worker pay gaps. Our results are robust after incorporating a broad set of control variables and adjusting for potential biases arising from selective disclosures. Further analysis shows that the negative relationship between dual class structure and CEO-employee pay disparity is more pronounced for firms in high tech industries and firms with more powerful CEOs. Overall, our findings provide novel empirical support to the propositions that dual class structure can offer economic benefits by better aligning the incentives of insiders with long-term value creation. Our results also have important implications for the policy debate on dual class structure and the larger debate on income inequality.