主题:供应商担保在供应链金融中的信息传递作用

时间: 2026年1月5日早上10:30

地点:管理科研楼第一教室

主讲人: 宋昊天 浙江大学管理学院

Bio:宋昊天，浙江大学管理学院服务科学与运营管理学系助理教授，博士毕业于纽约大学斯特恩商学院运营管理学系。

Abstract:  This paper investigates credit guarantees in a supply chain setting involving a supplier, a capital-constrained buyer, and a bank. We find that under complete information, credit guarantees increase order quantities but paradoxically raise wholesale prices, overall rendering the credit guarantee not useful for improving the operational efficiency. However, under information asymmetry, either a partial or full guarantee emerges in equilibrium, with the wholesale price maintained at its optimal full-information level. This underscores the pivotal role of credit guarantees in effective signaling and delineates the distinct functions of the wholesale price and the guarantee-the former on operational efficiency and the latter on signaling efficacy. Further comparative analysis of the supplier and buyer performances under the two contract types reveals that credit guarantees do not always benefit both parties.