主题: Workload and Unethical Practices: A Theoretical Exploration
中文题目：工作量与不道德行为：理论探索
时间: 2025年12月16日 上午10:00
地点: 管理科研楼一楼 第二教室
主讲人: Prof. Zhongyuan Hao, Associate Professor, Institute of Supply Chain Analytics, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
Bio: Zhongyuan Hao is an Associate Professor in the Institute of Supply Chain Analytics, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics. She received her PhD from The Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Her research interests include supply chain information management, credit market analysis, two-sided market design, and behavioral operations management. Her work has appeared in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, Production and Operations Management, Naval Research Logistics, Operations Research Letters, Omega, and the European Journal of Operational Research. She has led several research projects, including the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) Youth Fund and General Program.
Abstract: We investigates how provider workload affects the occurrence and form of unethical practices in service provision. Customers arrive with uncertain needs, classified as serious or minor, which the provider assesses and recommends services. The provider designs a menu that varies prices by service types and can leverage the information advantage over customers on their needs to enhance profit by conducting unethical practices. Based on the service menu and provider’s recommendation, customers decide whether to queue for service or leave. We find that the relative time efficiency of services and the composition of customers in terms of their needs shape the provider’s pricing and service strategies at various workload levels. The provider overcharges customers except when minor service is more time efficient than serious service, in which case the provider with high workloads would act honestly. Customers’ queueing for receiving services tames the provider’s tendency to be unethical. Compared to managing separate queues, managing a single queue can deter the occurrence of unethical behavior and benefit the provider in the meanwhile. Information asymmetry does not always give rise to market inefficiency, despite its mixed effects on the demand and average profit to the provider. Overtreatment is less likely to arise than overcharging, while enhanced transparency in service processes exerts mixed effects on the provider. Moreover, undertreatment would occur in a pattern opposite to that of overtreatment. These findings are crucial for shaping policies to mitigate unethical practices and bolster market efficiency.