Title:Retailer-Driven Bundling: To Commit or Not to Commit?

中文题目：零售商驱动的捆绑销售：承诺还是不承诺？

Speaker: Dr. Shengming Zheng, Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Management Science, University of Science and Technology of China

Time: 2025年9月29日 上午 9:00-10:00

Place: 管理科研楼一楼第一教室

Abstract:

This paper explores how commitment affects retailer-driven bundling in channels where a retailer sells two products, either from one multiproduct manufacturer or two separate manufacturers, and bundling adds consumer value.Two different game settings are scrutinized: no-commitment (i.e., the retailer determines its bundling strategy based on the manufacturer's wholesale decision) versus commitment (i.e., the retailer precommits to its bundling strategy: bundling or non-bundling), which are essentially different timing of bundling decisions.In the no-commitment setting, we show that the retailer may not prefer the stronger value-enhancement effect of bundling; indeed, the bundling option itself can even harm the retailer due to strategic pricing by two manufacturers. In the commitment setting, the retailer precommits to bundling with one manufacturer, but with two, only if the value-enhancement effect is sufficiently strong.Furthermore, it is optimal for the retailer to precommit to its bundling strategy only when the value-enhancement effect is weak (medium) with the single (two) manufacturer(s).In addition, the commitment to the bundling strategy makes product bundling more (less) likely to arise when the products are from the single (two) manufacturer(s), which consequently benefits (hurts) the manufacturer.

Bio:

Shengming Zheng is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Management Scienceat University of Science and Technology of China. He received his Ph.D. degree from the same department in 2021 and his B.S. in Mathematics and Applied Mathematics from Anhui University in 2014. His research interests include supply chain management, consumer behavior, and information asymmetry.