Title: Pricing vs. Auction: Matching Strategic Providers with Customers in Two-sided Markets
中文题目：定价机制与拍卖机制：双边市场中策略型服务提供商与顾客的匹配研究
Speaker: Dr. Chen Qianqian, Postdoctoral Researcher, School of Management, Zhejiang University
Time: 2025年10月29日 上午 9:00-10:00
Abstract:
We comparatively investigate dynamic pricing and uniform k-double auction in two-sided markets managed by a platform. In a two-period horizon, customers are myopic in seeking services, while providers are strategic in fulfilling demand. In dynamic pricing, the platform sets prices at the start of each period and randomly matches participating providers and customers. In uniform k-double auction, participants bid simultaneously, and matching takes place according to a policy enforced by the platform. In pricing or uniform k-double auction, the platform retains a commission fee for each successful match. We show that providers bid at discounted costs when customers have dominant bidding power, customers bid at valuations when providers have dominant bidding power, while providers' bid function is customers' bid function scaled by a factor determined by the commission rate when neither providers nor customers hold dominant bidding power. Under each mechanism, the platform adapts pricing (e.g., skimming, penetrating, or stable pricing) to fit market composition including the numbers of early customers in period 1, late customers in period 2, and providers. Dynamic pricing outperforms uniform k-double auction in yielding profit to the platform only when there are few late customers. The rise of strategic provider behavior discourages the platform from managing penetrating pricing but makes stable pricing more prevalent. Such strategic sophistication on the supply side is detrimental to the platform either in dynamic pricing when there is a moderate number of customers seeking services closer to the time of use or in uniform k-double auction when there are substantially fewer late-comers relative to early customers, while it can strengthen the platform's preference for uniform k-double auction, particularly when providers have strong bidding power.
Bio:
Chen Qianqian is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the School of Management at Zhejiang University. She received her Ph.D. degrees from the School of Management at Zhejiang University and from the Business School of The Hong Kong Polytechnic University in 2022, and her B.S. from the School of Economics and Management at Nanchang University in 2016. Her research interests include platform economy, live-streaming commerce, and revenue management.
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